

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.422
24 July 1969
ENGLISH

UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

OCT 29 1969

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 July 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI

(Poland)

GE.69-16811
69-15465

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U CHIT MYAING
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. J. CINGROS

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. K. ASAKAI
Mr. Y. NAKAYAMA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
Mr. Z. ERENDOO
Mr. S. ADIKHOU

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ
Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. SASU
Mrs. F. DINU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R. McCORMACK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the 422nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): First of all I should like, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, to associate myself with the congratulations which have been extended to the delegation of the United States on the success of the Apollo 11 mission. We pay the warmest tribute to the three astronauts for their magnificent exploit, which crowns so many efforts and adds another important link to the endless chain of progress. Our sincerest thoughts go at this time to Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins, to whom we wish a safe return to Earth in the next few hours. Since the day, eight years ago, when Yuri Gagarin inaugurated the era of outer-space exploration, we have been witnessing in amazement the realization of mankind's oldest dream. Besides arousing feelings of admiration, these achievements, we believe, strengthen confidence in man's ability to solve the problems facing him on earth.

3. Speaking for the first time at the present session, I should like to extend a welcome to the new participants in this Committee: the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Dugersuren, and the representative of Japan, Ambassador Asakai; and to the members of their delegations. We are glad to welcome the presence in this Committee of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, for we are sure that the cause of disarmament and our work can greatly benefit from the contribution of a country whose attachment to the cause of peace we know. My delegation knows also the great interest taken by Japan in the problems of disarmament. The direct association of that country with the efforts to find solutions to those problems will, we have no doubt, contribute to the success of our work. I should like also to extend to Ambassador Leonard the wishes of my delegation for every success in his task as head of the United States delegation and co-Chairman of the Committee.

4. Once again we are faced with problems which have long been on the agenda of our Committee. And as on each occasion when we have to take up the discussion, we begin, it seems to us, by realizing that in the meantime the solution of these problems has become more necessary and more urgent because, as has been emphasized repeatedly, the disarmament negotiations are taking place in a general situation whose outstanding feature is the arms race.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

5. Noting, for instance, the delays in the process of ratification and entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) -- delays due to causes sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to recall them -- we have to acknowledge that they are not calculated to facilitate efforts towards the adoption of other measures aimed at stopping the arms race and, first of all, the nuclear arms race.

6. In this connexion, may I inform the members of the Committee that on the 10th of this month the Presidium of the Bulgarian National Assembly ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which my country was one of the first to sign.

7. At the Committee's session from 18 March to 23 May the discussion bore on some of the most important problems on our agenda. It was, in our opinion, marked by a desire to proceed more quickly in the search for concrete solutions. Two draft conventions relating to the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor were submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union (ENDC/240) and that of the United States (ENDC/249), a working paper on the prohibition of underground tests was submitted by the delegation of Sweden (ENDC/242), and other working papers were submitted by the delegations of Canada (ENDC/244, 248 and 251), Italy (ENDC/245, 250), Mexico (ENDC/241) and Nigeria (ENDC/246, 247). Pending the receipt of the Secretary-General's report, a vigorous discussion took place on chemical and bacteriological weapons. We believe that those are elements which the current session can and must turn to account in order to arrive at the concrete results which the United Nations and the world expect from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

8. I now wish to refer to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which arouses keen interest in the Committee. New documents, in particular that entitled "Report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use" (A/7575), the draft convention (ENDC/255) submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, the working paper (ENDC/256) submitted by you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Polish delegation, and also the important statements made on the same subject by the delegations of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.418), the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.421), Poland (ibid.) and the United States (ibid., paras. 56 et seq.) call our attention again to this problem.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

9. My delegation has already had an opportunity to explain its position in this regard, but it goes without saying that the aforesaid documents and especially the Secretary-General's report, as well as certain events, make this subject outstandingly topical. We have studied the Secretary-General's report with the great care it merits, and we feel that it would be pointless to go into details of what we have no doubt all delegations know: that the report confirms everything that could be imagined about the anti-human and horrible nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In our view the report offers a complete picture of the horrors to which human beings would be condemned without any discrimination of age, condition or nationality were these weapons ever to be used, because they are easier to produce and transport, because it is difficult to detect their presence if they are used, and because more often than not they are perceived by their effects when it is already too late.

10. Moreover, chemical and bacteriological weapons not only act by themselves -- that is to say, by their capacity to kill; they are capable of arraying, so to speak, against man all the elements of nature: the soil, the wind, the rain, living beings, animals and plants, which serve to transmit them, preserve them and prolong their effects in time and space. Their effects are long-term, unlimited and unpredictable. They destroy foodstuffs and livestock. The civilian population has virtually no protection against them; the protection of domestic animals and plants is impracticable. Decontamination is difficult and complicated, because chemical and biological weapons impregnate the earth, the buildings and streets of large cities, and dwellings. One has only to read certain theoretically-possible recommendations, for example that of removing the topsoil by bulldozers, to understand the utter futility of counter-measures against these weapons.

11. It is appropriate to emphasize a quite alarming feature pointed out in paragraph 355 of the report, which states that the preparation of an armoury of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons could constitute in peacetime a danger to people living near production, storage and testing facilities. The members of this Committee are no doubt aware of the facts reported in recent weeks by the world Press concerning the death of thousands of animals and other grave accidents following experiments with toxic gases.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

12. The Bulgarian delegation is grateful to the Secretary-General and the experts for their efforts to present this startling picture in all its scientific clarity. We firmly believe that it will be very useful for the Committee's work, and that it will contribute to the greater enlightenment and alerting of public opinion in all countries so as to mobilize the will of everyone against the threat which chemical and bacteriological weapons represent.

13. We share the sentiment of the Secretary-General when he states that he is particularly impressed by the conclusion of the consultant experts:

"Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live." (A/7575, p. xi)

We trust that the Committee will draw the obvious conclusions in this instance. As far as my own delegation is concerned, we consider that the measures to be taken with the utmost urgency must outlaw chemical and bacteriological weapons as advocated by the Secretary-General in his Foreword to the report (*ibid.*, p. xii), and include in particular: first, accession by all States to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (*ibid.*, p. 117); second, affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future; third, the conclusion of an agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.

14. The Bulgarian delegation attaches very great importance to the accession of all countries to the Geneva Protocol and to an adequate interpretation of its spirit and meaning as an international instrument prohibiting the use in war of all chemical means without exception and of all bacteriological and biological agents.

15. In this connexion I should like to make some brief and quite preliminary comments suggested to my delegation by the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation concerning biological warfare. The members of the Committee will recall that the United Kingdom delegation's ideas -- now presented in the form of a draft convention (ENDC/255) -- have been widely discussed and that the Bulgarian delegation has clearly expressed its views on that subject (ENDC/PV.390). Therefore I shall refrain from reverting to what has already been said.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

16. Nevertheless, it seems to us necessary to emphasize the link which exists between chemical and bacteriological weapons and has been established and adopted in theory and practice. That link does not give rise to any doubt for jurists, military men or politicians.

17. In a book published in 1968 ^{1/} the French jurist H. Meyrowitz wrote on this subject as follows:

"In international law, as well as in the law of war and in the field of disarmament, biological weapons are closely linked to chemical weapons. The same applies in military theory and practice. This is also true of public opinion, in which chemical and biological weapons are united in one and the same image. This link is not based only on general usage or on an automatic association of ideas. It is founded on strong factual reasons deriving from both the technical and military characteristics and the effects of these weapons. It is usual in military literature and practice to include in the definition of biological weapons hormones or other chemical substances employed against vegetation. Toxins secreted by bacteria can be manufactured industrially; their composition can be modified and their pathogenic power increased by genetic and chemical processes. Military circles foresee the combined use of aggressive chemical and biological agents." ^{2/}

18. This is dealt with, for example, in the French military regulation TTA 661, where it is explained that a combination of chemical and biological weapons can be sought "... either to increase their effect or merely to make their detection more difficult, since an easily detectable weapon can mask the use of another weapon which is more effective but easy to detect." ^{2/}

19. This relationship between chemical and bacteriological weapons has led certain authors to classify them under a single heading as biochemical weapons.

1/ Henri Meyrowitz: *Les armes biologiques et le droit international: droit de la guerre et désarmement.*
Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 1968, p. 34.

2/ Translation by the Secretariat.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

20. The Working Group on chemical and biological weapons of the Fourteenth Pugwash Conference declared:

"In world public opinion, as in military practice, it seems impossible to discern any distinction between incapacitating and deadly weapons, or between biological and chemical warfare." ^{2/}

And the author I have already quoted concludes:

"That is why the monographic study of biological weapons must never lose sight of the association, in fact and in law, of chemical and bacteriological weapons, an association which runs counter to any proposal aimed at a separate regulation of biological weapons." ^{2/}

21. We know well, moreover, that chemical and biological weapons, as a pair, are themselves often lumped together with atomic weapons under the initials ABC, and sometimes called "special weapons". This name expresses the idea that these three types of weapons belong not merely to a new kind but to a kind that differs from conventional weapons -- in other words, the idea of a complete break with conventional weapons.

22. In disarmament circles it has become a tradition to call chemical and bacteriological weapons, in association with atomic weapons, "weapons of mass destruction". We find this term in many resolutions of the General Assembly -- in particular in its resolutions 1884 (XVIII) of 17 October 1963 and 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (2222 (XXI) Annex), and in the Soviet (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3) draft treaties on general and complete disarmament.

23. Consequently the association of bacteriological (biological) weapons and chemical weapons is a fact fully recognized by international law in theory and in practice. It is confirmed by the Secretary-General's report. It is one of the basic elements of the Geneva Protocol.

24. The United Kingdom initiative runs counter to this state of affairs in fact and in law. I wish to assure the United Kingdom delegation that there is no question of impugning its good faith. We greatly appreciate certain passages in the preamble to its draft convention which confirm the Geneva Protocol's merits, the services it has rendered, and the desire to strengthen these. But we are sincerely convinced that to dissociate bacteriological from chemical weapons -- to speak only of this for the present -- would alone be detrimental to the Geneva Protocol and hinder the application of its principles and the pursuit of its objectives.

2/ Translation by the Secretariat.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

25. The argument that the problem of chemical weapons is more difficult to solve and that we must therefore first tackle the means of biological warfare is not likely to convince us. And we have some difficulty in following the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Mulley, when he says that, if an agreement on biological weapons could be concluded this year, it would be possible to present to the General Assembly in 1970 -- that is, next year -- a similar measure covering chemical weapons (ENDC/PV.418, para.29). Perhaps we have failed to grasp the exact meaning of his words; but once it is admitted that the difficulties connected with chemical weapons could be surmounted within a few months, one may well ask why we should not tackle the whole problem now and simultaneously.

26. We cannot conceal our apprehensions about the harm which, for another reason, the dissociation of chemical from biological weapons would do to the Geneva Protocol. Indeed, there is reason to fear that it would have grave repercussions at the international level and on disarmament. At a time when the world needs to assert its will to condemn unanimously and unequivocally, in the spirit of the Geneva Protocol, any preparation for the possible use of chemical and biological weapons, the conclusion of a separate convention covering biological weapons alone would create a kind of dissociation of the attitudes and positions of States in regard to the problem. First of all, there would be States which had acceded to the Geneva Protocol; then there would be States which had acceded to the convention on biological weapons; then there would be States which would accede neither to the Geneva Protocol nor to the convention on biological weapons, and so on.

27. The Geneva Protocol has stood the test of time and everyone is aware of the role it has played and continues to play. My delegation, representing a country that has acceded to the Geneva Protocol, is ready to contribute to every effort designed to reaffirm and strengthen the Geneva Protocol. But we firmly believe that this can be done only by preserving its spirit and letter, and by grafting, so to speak, on to the Protocol's prohibition of the use of all means having a chemical and biological origin the prohibition of production, testing and stockpiling, so as to achieve a total and universal ban extending even to the idea of ever resorting to such weapons of horror.

28. Before I conclude, allow me to make a suggestion in all modesty. Would it not be timely and useful to widen the discussion of the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons along the lines I have tried to indicate and on a basis of

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

concrete proposals? The Bulgarian delegation would be gratified if such a lead were to come either from the co-Chairmen or from one or several delegations, and would support it fully.

29. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): I will today deal with the item on our agenda which bears the title "The prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed". This does not, however, signify that the Swedish delegation wants to assign top priority to this topic, as such priority should continue to be given to real disarmament in the nuclear field.

30. Since I last touched upon this matter of the demilitarization of the sea-bed, in an intervention on 22 April (ENDC/PV.405), some important developments have occurred. The United States delegation on 22 May tabled a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (ENDC/249). Further, the state of our negotiations on this matter was commented upon in general terms by the co-Chairmen at the opening meeting of this renewed session of our Committee (ENDC/PV.416). The representative of the United States, Ambassador Leonard, on that occasion read out a message to the Committee from the President of the United States in which it was said that

"Although differences exist, it should not prove beyond our ability to find common ground so that a realistic agreement may be achieved that enhances the security of all countries." (ENDC/253*).

The message went on to express a definite hope that

"Our goal should be to present a sound sea-bed arms control measure to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations" (ibid.).

31. The representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Roshchin, in his statement on the same occasion referred to the American draft treaty as a partial solution of the problem that he found inadequate

"... because it cannot ensure a definitive and complete solution of the problem of preventing the arms race spreading to the sea-bed and the ocean floor" (ENDC/PV.416, para. 30).

But he also expressed the hope

"... that a draft treaty to prevent the use of the sea-bed for military purposes will be elaborated at the present session of the Committee and then submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations" (ibid., para. 31).

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

32. Since I last spoke, other delegations also have offered valuable comments on the matter in the latter part of the Committee's spring session, and we have taken those into consideration. I wish to mention specifically the suggestions made by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff, on 13 May as to a concrete list of prohibited activities and installations (ENDC/PV.410), and to the persuasive appeals for an international solution of the control problem made by the representatives of Italy (ibid.) and Brazil (ENDC/PV.413). At this renewed session we have listened to important comments by the delegations of Japan (ENDC/PV.420), the United States (ENDC/PV.421) and the United Arab Republic (ibid., paras. 92 et seq.)

33. Summing up the situation in regard to our negotiating task, we have now on the table two draft treaty texts, presented by the delegations of the Soviet Union (ENDC/240) and the United States (ENDC/249) respectively. They vary considerably in the treatment of all the three main issues: scope of the prohibition, limitation of the area of prohibitions, and control methods. It is on these decisive points that all comments have been focussed.

34. Compromises must urgently be found on these points if the Committee is to fulfil the pledges by the co-Chairmen and present to the General Assembly one single agreed instrument. Even if the task of finding such a common solution may rest primarily on the two delegations which have put forward specific treaty texts, we consider it imperative that all delegations take part and try to make contributions. One reason, of course, is that a final solution, to be generally acceptable, will have to be so construed as to enhance the security of all countries -- to borrow the words employed by the President of the United States.

35. The gaps which we shall then have to narrow may be briefly indicated as follows.

36. First, the scope of prohibitions: according to the Soviet text all direct military uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor are prohibited (article 1), while the United States draft, as its title indicates, limits the prohibition to the installation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and of launching platforms for such weapons (article I).

37. Secondly, as far as the size of the area of prohibition is concerned, both drafts provide for an excepted area along the coasts, measured from base lines -- a maritime zone -- which however in the United States draft is suggested as a width of three nautical miles (article II) and in the Soviet draft as twelve miles (article 3).

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

38. Thirdly, the control of the fulfilment by the parties of the obligations under the treaty is in the Soviet proposal based on free access by all parties to all installations on the sea-bed beyond the maritime zone (article 2). In the United States text it is suggested that there should be free observation by all parties of all installations, but that further measures of verification, such as access to a suspected installation, could only be carried out after prior consultation between the parties involved (article III).

39. I intend now to deal in some detail with these various aspects of the matter, and to make some concrete suggestions on how the differences could be overcome.

40. Regarding the scope of the prohibition, we agree with the point of view expressed by several delegations that the prohibition against nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction is -- in the environment of the sea as in all environments -- the most urgent one. Such prohibition should therefore, in our view, be specifically spelt out in any compromise draft treaty text. We feel however -- again sharing this opinion with several other delegations -- that the treaty should not limit its prohibitions to weapons of mass destruction. It should in principle extend to all weapons, and to military bases and fortifications and to other installations and structures of a military nature fixed on or in the sea-bed and the ocean floor, some exceptions being made, however, for devices which are of a purely passive defensive character, such as means of communication, navigation and supervision.

41. From many points of view it would be desirable to make both the prohibitions and the exceptions quite specific. We have studied carefully the suggestions put forward for that purpose by the Canadian delegation on 13 May, containing an enumeration of prohibited installations and activities. We regret to have to state that we have found that road impracticable. The list becomes too detailed and the definitions become too complicated to be workable. It leaves unsettled the important problem that new military developments may occur which might not be covered.

42. The representative of the United States, Ambassador Leonard, in his intervention on 22 July, referred to the possibility of using the review conferences provided for in the United States draft treaty to establish additional substantive prohibitions (ENDC/PV.421, para. 38). We, however, consider it would be more practical to use such an opportunity to establish further exemptions rather than further prohibitions, if a general need for such restrictions of the scope of the demilitarization should be felt at that time.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

43. We consider that it would be difficult to reach agreement on a detailed list; therefore we prefer a more general characterization of the prohibitions in accordance with the formula I have just suggested, stating only the nature of exempted structures and installations as "purely passive defensive" without enumerating them in the treaty text. What, then, the exemplification -- or rather the interpretation -- is when we say "such as means of communication, navigation and supervision" should, however, be made quite explicit and should be agreed by all of us while we are negotiating the provisions. It should thus become clear that with this formula such purely passive defensive structures as sonar devices for tracking submarines would be excluded from the prohibition -- a suggestion in line, as we understand it, with the strongly-held view of several delegations.

44. That is our attempt at a compromise in regard to the scope of the prohibitions.

45. As far as the size of the area of prohibitions is concerned, I wish also to try out some new suggestions, in the hope that they might serve as a basis for a compromise.

46. The United States representative, in putting forward his proposal regarding a very narrow band of three miles as excepted from the prohibitions, argued forcefully that the prohibition should extend to the maximum practical area of the sea-bed and that the delimitation of the prohibited area should be separated from such complex issues as territorial claims and national jurisdiction (ENDC/PV.414, para. 9).

We agree with both those criteria. Consequently we appreciate the merits of restricting the width of the excluded band to three miles, the narrowest claim for a territorial sea by any nation. On the other hand we had earlier supported the Soviet proposal of a twelve-mile wide maritime zone; and the representative of Canada has stated many valid reasons for at least that large a zone where the interests of the coastal State should predominate (ENDC/PV.410, paras. 7-9). Recalling that the three-mile limit on the one hand and the twelve-mile limit on the other envisage a very different scope of prohibitions, we wish to suggest a combination of the ideas proffered.

47. First, a three-mile exempted band along the coast could be applied in the case of a prohibition -- to speak with the American draft treaty, article I:

"... to emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the sea-bed and ocean floor ..."

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

48. Second, in the compromise solution that we have in mind should be retained the idea from the Soviet draft treaty of a maritime zone of twelve miles, beyond which would start the more comprehensive prohibition against militarization in accordance with the general characterization I utilized a little while ago.

49. Within the whole maritime zone of twelve miles the coastal State should have the exclusive right to military uses of the sea-bed to the extent that they are not prohibited by the treaty, meaning in practice full freedom except for the installation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction beyond the three-mile coastal band. Within the whole maritime zone the coastal State should also have exclusive rights and obligations as far as verification of the treaty provisions is concerned.

50. The formula here outlined has been construed as a compromise between the proposals in the two treaty drafts presented by the Soviet Union and the United States. It might also be seen as a compromise between the two most far-reaching suggestions made in our Committee: namely by Japan and Canada respectively (ENDC/PV.420, paras.14, 15; ENDC/PV.410, para.9); that is, between a zero zone as regards nuclear weapons and a 200-mile safety zone for defensive purposes.

51. The Swedish delegation would certainly not object to the Japanese formula per se, if the control problems could be solved and the proposal would meet with general approval. We have, however, rather set out to try to formulate a compromise solution in transactional terms: that is, staying close to what the two draft treaty texts have actually proposed but combining these provisions in what we hope is a constructive way. May I add that Sweden has tested in relation to its own maritime position the proposals put forward, and in all suggestions made or supported has taken into consideration the security interests of a country like ours with narrow seas over a broad continental shelf adjacent to a long coastline. We have, however, examined also the applicability to different geo-political situations.

52. Speaking generally and with the interest of the world community as a whole in mind, our formula with a two-tier zone would seem to present a double advantage. It safeguards the sea-bed and ocean floor from all nuclear weapons and other installations for weapons of mass destruction, except a band of three miles which in all cases belongs to the territorial sea. In this connexion we ought, of course, to remind ourselves of the principal aim to eliminate all nuclear armaments. The formula reserves a somewhat wider area for the exclusive use and control by coastal States, permitting measures

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

which may be essential for national defence purposes. It also eliminates the difficulty inherent in the present Soviet draft, according to which the situation became undefined for certain areas in relation to States with less extensive territorial sea than twelve miles: that is, in regard to the zone between the outer limit of their territorial sea and the twelve-mile limit.

53. Coming now to the question of control, one might object that the control procedure is made more complex by the delimitation of two different zones: the three-mile limit for the obligation not to install nuclear weapons further out, and the twelve-mile limit for the exclusive use and control of the coastal State. It has, however, been stated by the United States representative that nuclear installations on the sea-bed will be large affairs. They should be observable with enough accuracy to set in motion the additional control machinery to be provided in the treaty. Here I wish to emphasize that in regard to the twelve-mile maritime zone observation, if carried out in consistence with international law, would not be hampered by the exclusive rights of a coastal State which I have mentioned earlier.

54. Let me now leave the question of observation and turn to the further measures of control -- that is, verification. In the earlier part of today's intervention I tried to pinpoint the differences in approach on this score between the Soviet and the United States draft treaty texts. We for our part wish to retain in principle the idea of free access contained in the Soviet draft, as I stated in my intervention on 22 April (ENDC/PV.405, para.91). In this context I wish to recall in passing that a number of delegations, including my own, have earlier criticized as unsatisfactory that part of the Soviet text which contains the notion of reciprocity in control functions. Further, a strong appeal has been made for including the possibility that the verification process might, when this becomes feasible, be committed by a party to an appropriate international organization.

55. Finally, appeals have been made that a party should also have the possibility to ask for the full or partial assistance of any other party to the treaty for carrying out the verification procedure. The representative of the United States in his recent statement (ENDC/PV.421, paras.48 et seq.) gave his reasons against international arrangements and against commitments for third-party assistance. Like several other delegates --- most recently the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, in his intervention on 22 July (ibid., paras.113 et seq.) --- I wish,

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

however, to support these appeals as being important to many countries throughout the world. They are fully in line with the formula of co-operation used in the United States draft, and do not imply any binding obligation on a particular party to give such assistance in a particular case.

56. A further important point in connexion with control is the one I outlined earlier of giving the coastal State in principle the exclusive right but also the obligation to carry out verification in its maritime zone. This provision is not in contradiction to either of the two existing drafts. We only suggest that such a right and obligation for the coastal State should be clearly spelt out. Any desire by another party to proceed with further verification must obviously be channelled through the coastal State and could only be undertaken with its co-operation.

57. If parts of the continental shelf adjacent to a coastal State extend beyond the twelve-mile limit of the maritime zone, some uncertainty undoubtedly remains as to the rights of verification on that outer shelf. The coastal State, according to existing international law, has sole rights of exploration and exploitation. Any installations in this area of the sea-bed must be presumed therefore to belong to the coastal State or to have been installed with its consent. Here the principle of free access meets a real test. In our opinion that principle ought to be upheld; but as a matter of international courtesy it would be normal for consultations to take place with the coastal State concerned. I wish to add that these difficulties should be considerably reduced, and risks of conflicts even more so, if revisions of the international legislation regarding the continental shelf were made so as to establish firm delimitations instead of the present open-ended situation.

58. Where the principle of free access is applicable without any limitation, of course, is in regard to the deep ocean floor proper as well as to sea-beds at any depth which are unconnected with continental shelves of particular coastal States -- for instance so-called sea mountains and ridges. Many parts of the ocean are so shallow as to make the floor accessible already now by conventional capabilities for maritime exploration, which are in the possession of many States. These parts may also be the very ones to tempt nations to establish installations and structures. Exploration activities, which are permitted to all, must be open to the kind of verification envisaged in this treaty. In reality the principle of free access is but a corollary of the commonly-recognized principle of free exploration of the sea-bed invoked in the first preambular

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

paragraph of the United States draft. It is also concomitant with the principle of the sea-bed and ocean floor being the common heritage of mankind, to be used in the interests of all and not subjected in any part to the national sovereignty of individual States.

59. This is the grand scheme which we all, as Members of the United Nations, are pursuing in regard to the positive task of utilizing the sea-bed for peaceful purposes. The demilitarization of the sea-bed is but the preliminary step towards avoiding obstacles and impediments to the fully free and common utilization of this, man's last frontier.

60. In conclusion, I wish to summarize as follows the ideas tentatively presented here in order to seek a compromise between the Soviet and the United States drafts on the demilitarization of the sea-bed.

61. We should retain, from the United States draft, the notion of prohibiting all nuclear weapons and installations for weapons of mass destruction beyond a three-mile zone adjacent to the coastlines.

62. A further prohibition in regard to all weapons, and to military bases and fortifications and other installations of a military nature, except some which are of a purely passive, defensive character -- such as means of communication, navigation and supervision -- should be valid beyond a twelve-mile maritime zone along the coastlines, as suggested in the Soviet draft.

63. Within the twelve-mile zone the coastal State should have the exclusive right of use and verification, the right of observation by all already being assured in international law. Beyond this maritime zone any installations on the sea-bed should be open to all parties for verification. A procedure for assistance or for verification by an appropriate international organization should be foreseen.

64. We suggest further that the method for determining baselines outlined in the two drafts be maintained and that the idea of a review conference, as suggested in the United States draft, be incorporated in a final text.

65. In reviewing this whole subject of demilitarization of the sea-bed I wish to stress the importance of taking action urgently. The moment is opportune, while demilitarization is still a "non-armament measure". The effect of the treaty must be preventive. By prohibiting both weapons of mass destruction and conventional

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

military installations it should serve not only to prevent such military uses of the sea-bed as are already feasible but also to curb further developments. The treaty is envisaged as being preventive in another sense also. I am thinking of its value in forestalling international conflicts which might arise out of different interpretations as to existing rights and out of national claims on parts of the sea-bed.

66. If the ideas I have put forward today should be considered worth retaining by my colleagues, I am sure that the actual drafting of such a compromise treaty text would not be difficult; it would consist largely of amendments. My delegation would be happy to take part in such an exercise. We have worked out our proposals in the hope that it will be possible to bring forward to the General Assembly this year a final instrument, not only in the names of the co-Chairmen but as a joint recommendation from the whole Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 422nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Antoni Czarkowski, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria and of Sweden.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 29 July 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.